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Introduction
Th is thesis challenges the dominant notions of cultural pluralism that up-
held the idea of American exceptionalism in the Cold War era. Th e pluralistic 
model of society became popular during WWII with the idea that the United 
States was ﬁ ghting for democracy as a universal principle regardless of race. 
Out of the context of the war, the idea that the United States was “a harmoni-
ous nation made up of people from diverse ethnic, racial, national, and reli-
gious backgrounds” became the widely accepted ideology. Within the subse-
quent Cold War national ideology, cultural explanations came to replace 
biological theories of race: if racial diﬀ erences are superﬁ cial cultural diﬀ er-
ences, culturally diﬀ erent people from all over the world could come to the 
United States and become assimilated and acculturated Americans. Given that 
Asia became an important site for the United States to secure its geopolitical 
hegemony in Cold War politics, the concept of cultural pluralism created the 
space where alleged “inassimilable” Asians could assimilate and acculturate 
into the nation. Indeed, achieving racial integration and becoming a demo-
cratic and morally superior nation was the nation’s challenge during the Cold 
War era. Th is thesis presents how Japanese war brides as “a problem for as-
similation” were incorporated into the U.S. culturally pluralist nation.
Th e new melting pot problems continue to come to this country as an 
aftermath of war. Th e latest is assimilation of Japanese occupation brides. 
[ . . . ] THE TENDENCY of United States occupation men to marry 
Japanese girls proved a surprise to many Americans in Japan, especially 
civilian girls with the occupation forces. Th ey had believed the American 
men were merely having ﬂ irtations with the doll-like Japanese. But soon 
a rush to the altar began. Chief opponents of this were the mothers of the 
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Japanese brides. Th ey foresaw unhappiness for their daughters in the 
United States because of the discrimination they would face.1
Th e 1948 Washington Post article reported Japanese brides to be a problem 
for the U.S. nation. Americans in Japan expected American men to be “mere-
ly having ﬂ irtations with the doll-like Japanese” during the occupation; they 
“surprisingly” became American soldiers’ wives. Th ese brides became the sub-
ject of the U.S. national problem to solve in terms of the idea of assimilation 
— that is, whether they could “melt into” the nation as American national 
subjects in the postwar context.
Th e following 1952 article which was featured in the Saturday Evening Post, 
also expressed the continuing fear of how all these Japanese brides would ﬁ t 
into U.S. society. Th ese brides received speciﬁ c attention under the question 
of whether they could become American wives and mothers.
Nothing much but time and bitter experience can overcome great haz-
ards like language diﬃ  culty, racial question marks and the separation of 
truth about America from the dream of America as expounded by home-
sick soldiers and distorted movies. But some Americans in Japan have felt 
that the least which could be done for these potential newcomers was to 
give them a little idea of how to get along in their new homes. One result 
was the brides’ schools.2
Brides’ schools run by the Red Cross were established out of the tremendous 
fear of whether thousands of Japanese brides could ﬁ t into American homes. 
With the idea of “racial question marks,” particularly deﬁ ned by their immo-
rality and inferiority, Japanese girls’ suitability for American wifehood and 
motherhood was questionable. Within this kind of postwar context, the bride 
school became the solution for turning these Japanese women into potential 
American wives and mothers.
Th e school was established and deﬁ ned as “helping” Japanese brides to 
know American wifehood and domesticity and succeed in their marriages. A 
New York Times article published in 1954 introduced American public to the 
bride school operated in Japan.
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Th e strange names — half Japanese and half American — exemplify the 
purpose of the class: to teach young Japanese girls how to make happy 
homes for their American husbands upon the couples’ return to the 
United States. [ . . . ] Th e lessons give the girls the conﬁ dence and train-
ing they need to make their marriage successful.3
Th e bride school was articulated as teaching and training for Japanese brides 
to make happy homes for their American husbands. Th e schools’ volunteer 
women also came to see the project as “helping” these brides overcome the 
“racial barriers” and ﬁ t into American society and domesticity. Th is thesis ar-
gues that the privatized sphere of domesticity became a site of domination and 
colonization in the context of postwar U.S.-Japan relations at the beginning 
of Cold War. I conceptualize domesticity — the site for Japanese women to 
become American wife and mother — not as private and personal, but as 
central and political. In doing so, this essay sheds light on American women’s 
role in the colonial project of “assimilation” of Japanese women given that 
American women tend to become invisible from political and colonial proj-
ects and speciﬁ cally absent from the involvement of American occupation of 
Japan.
In doing so, this paper conceptualizes ideas of “American housewife, family 
and domesticity” as a site that diﬀ erentially but relationally constructs Japa-
nese brides and American wives. At one session, a bride school president 
concluded the meeting articulating the school in this way:
Th ere is no way to measure how much eﬀ ective help we might be giving 
these brides as they leave us, if we could let it be known widely in Amer-
ica that close contacts with these girls have brought to us understanding 
and a sympathetic love that breaks through all racial barriers.4
Indeed, the bride school was conceived of as an American benevolent project 
to help these girls. Yet, I wonder how these bride school projects emerged right 
after the war and when the United States still occupied Japan. In the postwar 
context, where both American military personnel and Japanese citizens likely 
regarded each other as enemy ﬁ gures, why and how did American women 
become benevolent teachers who taught Japanese women American ways of 
domesticity? Why and how did the bride schools appear as helping and teach-
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ing rather than forced inculcation?5 Th is thesis understands the Japanese war 
bride diﬀ erence as a strategy of power to produce premise of universal ideas, 
especially the notion of gender freedom and equality that sustained the supe-
riority of American wives. With this, I am interested in how the bride school 
teaching depoliticized and naturalized understandings of what American do-
mesticity and family / gender relations are always in relation to what Japanese 
ways are.
I. Brides’ Schools as a Possible Solution to Otherwise Tragic Marriages
Brides’ school was rooted in the volunteer works initially held by the Chris-
tian Woman’s Association of Tokyo. Th e association started the volunteer 
work in Tokyo in 1948 to help Japanese brides adjust to American society and 
domesticity. Public Law 717 in 1950, Public Law 6 in 1951, and the 1952 
McCarran Walter Act, which removed the racial restriction for marriages, trig-
gered a number of marriages between American men and Japanese women. 
Th e Army took up the Christian association’s idea and asked the Red Cross to 
establish the brides’ schools to teach Japanese wives American ways of life.6 
Th e military asked the Red Cross because:
“Th e military feels that because this school proved itself to be so beneﬁ -
cial it now asks that Red Cross volunteer units to set up similar activities 
wherever possible throughout the Far East Th eater of Operations.
“. . . . . . . . It is hoped that each volunteer group will undertake the plan-
ning and conducting of such a school as this had become an important 
way that we, as Americans, can assist in preparing these Japanese brides 
for their new life in the United States.7
Th e Army saw women’s organizations assisting Japanese brides beneﬁ cial and 
started a joint force of the Christian woman’s association and the Red Cross in 
Yokohama in 1951.8 Th e American consulate sent invitation letters to the 
servicemen who had married Japanese women and also distributed them 
through the military units.9
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Th e military requested schools, run by the Red Cross, expanded through-
out Japan in the 1950s. Since the ﬁ rst school started in 1951, the number of 
schools and graduates shifted as below.
Year No. Schools No. Graduates No. Volunteers
1951 7 160 125
1952 8 326 173
1953 9 390 218
1954 16 563 514
1955 25 1,122 554
1956 25 885 329
1957 12 533 561
Total 102 3,979 2,474
Figure 4.1 U.S. Military’s Bride School Project
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Th e number of the schools and graduates was at peak in the mid-50s. Th e 
schools had a uniﬁ ed system, held usually twice a year — spring and fall. Th ey 
had edited and revised the textbook — a thick volume resembling a telephone 
directory — throughout the years. As of 1955, the text book included Japa-
nese translation in addition to English originals and consisted of 243 pages.11 
Th e class usually covered American culture and customs, religion, cooking, 
nursing and child care, American history and geography, information on pass-
ports and visas, grooming, life in American home and social life in America. 
Th ese topics were usually taught for eight weeks and there was a graduation 
ceremony giving a certiﬁ cate to prove their completion of the program at the 
end of the courses. Th e schools were held inside of the camps, usually at the 
chapel.12 It was sometimes held in teachers’ homes, especially in the cooking 
class due to the need for kitchens, and also homemaking class to show what an 
“American home” looked like.13
Th e military covered the basic costs for schools so it was practically free for 
Japanese brides. Th e military provided classrooms, printing of brides’ school 
books, interpreters, speakers, posters, and radio and newspaper publicity.14 
Th e rest was ﬁ nanced by the volunteers, volunteer clubs, and religious groups 
and the Red Cross. Th e majority of class teachers consisted of military person-
nel’s wives.15 Th e Red Cross sometimes invited volunteer teachers from other 
areas; the American Embassy and educational groups such as Fulbright com-
mission.16
While the bride school was perceived as a Red Cross volunteer project, it 
was in actuality a military project. Th e military not only funded the schools 
but it intended to produce Japanese brides who could assist their American 
soldier husbands. To make sure Japanese girls learned American wifehood and 
motherhood, the school asked their husbands to watch them and report back, 
“if [his] wife does not understand any subject or is getting the wrong impres-
sion.”17 Th e schools’ ﬁ rst aim was also articulated as an eﬀ ort “to help the girls 
and their husbands establish a good and happy home” and “to introduce 
[Japanese girls] to American customs and manners and the American way of 
life.”18 Th e school’s purpose was to help Japanese girls to “make a happy home” 
for their American husbands. With completion of the school session, “Japa-
nese girls” graduated from the school with their husband.
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Before analyzing the Red Cross’s bride school project, I ﬁ rst situate the 
bride school mission within the larger context of the relationship between the 
U.S. military and the Red Cross within the international politics. While the 
International Convention of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that its mis-
sion was in assisting war victims and that the Red Cross activities were impar-
tial and neutral humanitarian missions, Nicholas O Berry critically points out 
that the ICRC was complicit with America and its allies’ military activities by 
mediating and covering up the violence of war.20 David P. Forsythe argues that 
the ICRC reorders the morality for international relations during the Cold 
War and points out that the United States and its allies used the ICRC’s moral 
organization for their military purposes.21 It is important to understand the 
Red Cross “benevolent” activity of establishing the bride schools within the 
larger U.S. military activities of the occupation. Th e U.S. military asserts the 
bride school as its activity of “charity” along with its mass production of the 
“tragic” marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women.
Th e bride schools sponsored by the military came out of the strong belief 
that the marriages between Japanese brides and American soldiers were 
doomed to be failures. Th e school started on March 26 in 1951 at the chapel 
center in Tokyo and had a meeting on May 25 1951 at the end of the session. 
In the meeting, in addition to eight chairmen of the school, some volunteers 
and interpreters exchanged their opinions and comments about the school 
Figure 4.2 Graduation Ceremony
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session.22 Th e opinion exchange articulated that the brides’ school was cap-
tured as a possible solution for otherwise tragic marriages between American 
husbands and Japanese women. Initially, some of these volunteers even 
doubted the legitimacy of these marriages and Japanese women becoming 
American wives. As a volunteer worker opined,
I think I have been in the narrow-minded category, too. When I was 
asked to help with the school I said I did not want to any part in it, that 
I had ﬁ ve sons and it would break my heart if one of them should marry 
a Japanese girl.23
Th is woman’s remark suggests that Japanese women were not even considered 
assist-able and loveable subjects whom American volunteers would want to 
help. Another American volunteer expressed that she started the volunteer 
work with the idea that “a mixed marriage could end only in tragedy.”
Most of us were brought up to feel that a mixed marriage could end only 
in tragedy, and when we were in school I think most of our professor had 
the same feeling.24
In sum, the bride school project was carried out with the idea that marriages 
between American GIs and Japanese girls were going to be otherwise “unsuc-
cessful” and that Japanese women were not even ﬁ t to enter into these mar-
riages.
While marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women were 
“doomed to fail” because of their racial diﬀ erence, the school project came to 
explain their racial diﬀ erence as cultural. Th e idea that these Japanese brides 
can “learn” American ways animated the brides’ school project. Th e Red Cross 
explained its school project as such:
Chopsticks to knife and fork, ﬂ owing kimono to Western chic, a jack-
knife bow to warm handclap -even an un-Japanese kiss. Th at’s how far 
daughters of Nippon break with customs a thousand years old after 
learning to make homes for their new American husbands in brides’ 
schools conducted in Japan by the American Red Cross.25
Some scholars in the ﬁ eld of Cold War studies argue that the cultural explana-
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tion of human diﬀ erences was used for Cold War politics within the U.S. at-
tempt to represent itself as a democratic and humanitarian nation for people 
all over the world regardless of race.26 Within the popular idea of assimilation 
and acculturation in the Cold War context, brides’ school projects tended to 
be captured as a site to teach American domesticity to Japanese brides and 
considered that they can learn American ways by acquiring American cultural 
values. More importantly, however, it was the Cold War U.S. empire that 
brought about the need to overcome racism through the bride school projects. 
Japanese women were a threat to the then popular idea of miscegenation so 
that they were “impossible subjects” to become American wives.27 Marriages 
between American soldiers and Japanese women happened out of occupation, 
and how these brides could be incorporated into the nation became the na-
tion’s challenge at the shifting moment from wartime politics to Cold War 
politics. Rather than whether Japanese brides could overcome racial barriers, 
the question became whether the U.S. nation can overcome racism and incor-
porate Japanese brides.
II.　 New Postwar U.S.-Japan Alliance: Th e United States would Over-
come Racial Barriers in Cold War Politics
Th e bride school, launched as a military project in 1951, was presented as a 
potential solution for otherwise tragic marriages. Soon after the school started, 
volunteer women saw their activities as helping these women to overcome 
“racial barriers” in the United States. In the meeting held in May 25, 1951, a 
volunteer remarked about her engagement in school activities:
I think many of us now have decided that we were mistaken and that the 
only way to get a United Nations spirit the world over is to forget that 
there are such diﬀ erences and to realize that there can be successful inter-
marriage, regardless of diﬀ erences in race. As we send some of these girls 
we have met here over to the United States and through them show some 
of the people in the United States that Japanese and those of diﬀ erent 
races are fundamentally the same and that we can get along together, 
perhaps it will help.28
Th ese volunteer women recognized their activities as support for the racially-
diﬀ erent brides to be able to break the racial barrier and succeed in their inter-
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racial marriage. American woman’s engagement with bride school project can 
also be read productively as an allegory for the reconstruction of a new rela-
tionship between the United States and Japan. An American woman volunteer 
remarked that “we can get along together” at the new era of the Cold War. At 
the end of the meeting, another woman concluded that the bride school gave 
a hand to these impossible brides to “break through all racial barriers.”
Th ere is no way to measure how much eﬀ ective help we might be giving 
these brides as they leave us, if we could let it be known widely in Amer-
ica that close contacts with these girls have brought to us understanding 
and a sympathetic love that breaks through all racial barriers.29
Within the Cold War framework, Japanese brides became “hopes” who can 
overcome racial barriers, just as Japan could become a friend of the United 
States as allies of Cold War.
Japanese brides stood for the postwar Japan as a new nation of the allied for 
the United States in Cold War politics. Christina Klein made a signiﬁ cant 
argument that “the mixed-race families oﬀ ered a way to imagine Americans 
overcoming the ingrained racism that so threatened U.S. foreign policy goals 
in Asia” during the Cold War.30 At the beginning of the Cold War, Japan be-
came the ﬁ rst important nation for the United States to expand the U.S. 
geopolitical hegemony over Asia. Given that family entails emotional unity 
with internally structured hierarchies of diﬀ erence, it serves for a model of 
Cold War “free world” community “that included Western and non-Western, 
developed and underdeveloped, established and newly created nations.”31 Th e 
visibility of the Japanese brides could be understood within this framework; 
Japanese girls who married American GIs became symbolic ﬁ gures who po-
tentially overcome the racial barriers in the United States in the way in which 
Japan overcome racial barriers and become a U.S. ally during the Cold War.
Japanese girls who potentially overcome the racial barriers were also read as 
those who “want to learn American domesticity” within the framework of 
U.S. cultural pluralism. For example, a director in the bride school, Mrs. 
Frank O. Blake, gave a speech about the bride school project as “love” and 
mentioned, “It represented the regular attendance by the brides and their eager 
attentiveness; their willingness and honest wish to master American ways and 
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skills.”32 Another director praised Japanese brides as those who were eager to 
learn everything American.
Th ough the new ways are indeed strange, if not impossible, these students 
are eager to learn them; class attendance is nearly perfect, and few ﬂ unk 
the course. In the almost nine years since the war ended, uniformed 
Americans have become commonplace in the Japanese scene, and Japa-
nese girls observe Western manners everywhere even if they ﬁ nd them 
hard to understand. But they try.
“What are you most interested in?” is a question asked in the ARC school 
application. Typical of the spirit of these young ladies is the answer of a 
brand new bride, “Everything American.” 33
She perceived the success of the school by viewing Japanese brides as those 
who want to learn everything American. In her speech, I liken Japanese girls’ 
spirits of wanting to learn everything American to Japan’s spirits of wanting to 
learn Western manners in the Cold War moment. Another story released in 
the Red Cross newspaper also emphasized that the students are the ones who 
want to learn “our cooking and the way to keep an American house.”
She wants to learn our cooking and the way to keep an American house. 
She has heard about our modern appliances and wants to see them. In 
many instances since her marriage, she and her husband are still living 
Japanese style. Th erefore, the art for making beds, modern bathrooms 
and kitchen are of great interest. Th rough the kindness of volunteer de-
pendents, the Japanese bride is invited into their homes for this practical 
experience.34
Japanese women’s mindset, “want[ing] to learn,” was something necessary for 
the U.S. Army and Red Cross: Japanese women “who want to learn” makes 
the bride school project as “help” and “love” but not “force” and “power.” In-
deed, Japanese women who want to learn everything American were the per-
fect subjects at the beginning of the Cold War: Within the framework that 
these Japanese girls stood for the postwar Japan, the discourse of these girls 
oﬀ ered to envision Japan’s willingness to learn American ways under the U.S. 
occupation over Japan. Th e idea of Japan’s willingness eﬀ ectively made the 
U.S. occupation of Japan American benevolent liberation and rehabilitation, 
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and not domination and exploitation.
III.　 “We Are Ambassadors of the United States”: Teaching Modern and 
Democratic Ways of Domesticity
As the bride school itself was captured as a symbol for the new national rela-
tion in Cold War politics, women volunteers gained their identity as ambas-
sadors between the United States and Japan. A woman director described the 
role of the bride school in this way.
Th e role of the American Red Cross volunteer in the Far Eastern Area is 
outstandingly expressed in brides’ schools. Th ey are a continuous, round-
the-year project, the results of which can be a strong link between Japan 
and the United States for generations. Th is enormous Red Cross volun-
teer eﬀ ort represents an unbroken chain of dependent wives who have 
come and gone from the Far East over the past several years.35
Within the context of the beginning of the Cold War, these women identiﬁ ed 
themselves as “grass-roots ambassadors” who build new friendship with Japa-
nese girls. In this sense, the bride school project was also articulated as “love.” 
One of the directors of the Red Cross explained what the diploma that Japa-
nese brides received in bride schools stood for as: “It represented love; ﬁ rst, the 
kind of love that brought about the Japanese American marriage, meeting and 
overcoming many obstacles, and second, the kind of love the members of the 
Red Cross and the other volunteers manifested in wishing to teach, to lead 
and to help.”36 Indeed, the bride school project came to be expressed as love 
and friendship that American volunteer wives provided Japanese girls whose 
ﬁ tness for American domesticity was deemed questionable.
It is also interesting to note that American women themselves thought that 
they overcame racial barriers and came to love Japanese girls through the 
school project. A woman who had once harbored hatred against the idea that 
her son would have a Japanese bride expressed how she came to love Japanese 
brides:
But by the time I had been teaching these girls eight weeks I was admit-
ting that I could understand why the American boys fell in love with 
such lovely girls. I cannot help saying here that I would enjoy having one 
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of them as my own daughter-in-law. Th ey are a ﬁ ne lot of girls and I 
thoroughly enjoyed my experience in teaching and helping them adjusts 
to American ways.37
By overcoming racial hatred, especially strengthened during the war, women 
volunteers gained their identity as ambassadors who overcame racism and 
“loved” Japanese brides. Th ey recognized their activities as establishing friend-
ship with Japan / Japanese brides at the beginning of Cold War.
Th en, did this love mitigate hierarchy between colonizer / victor and colo-
nized / defeated? Did this love and sisterhood make both Japanese girls and 
American volunteers overcome racial barriers? Did American women volun-
teers and Japanese girls ﬁ ght against male dominance together? I argue that 
the love and sisterhood between American women volunteers and Japanese 
girls further articulate the racial diﬀ erences and produce the hierarchy allow-
ing American wives to be superior, modern and democratic and Japanese 
wives to be inferior, traditional and feudalistic. Indeed, the process of how to 
learn everything American was learning what is American. Here, I also argue 
that American wives gained superior status as their Cold War identity through 
the bride school project. By articulating the school project as a friendship 
building and loving project, American volunteers gained superior, modern, 
and democratic identity through Japanese domesticity as unfree, male domi-
nant, and hierarchical.
Given that homemaking class was one of the main curricula in bride school, 
the idea of cooking and household became a site to deﬁ ne the superiority of 
American domesticity. In homemaking class, a teacher articulated what 
American domesticity was in this manner.
Some of you are probably thinking, “Why, my grandmother, and my 
mother and I have done the cleaning and the washing and the cooking 
for years; what’s so diﬀ erent about that?” Th e biggest diﬀ erence is that 
[ . . . ], American women try to plan not to have to do them all every day. 
For example, most girls in America who have washing machines will 
wash just once a week — it saves us time and money and it’s often a long 
way to the store; maybe we even plan to do a lot of cooking at one time 
to save fuel and time, and with a refrigerator to store food in, that is pos-
sible.38
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American domesticity was deﬁ ned by modern technologies such as a vacuum 
cleaner, a refrigerator, and a washing machine. Th ese technologies deﬁ ned the 
superiority of American domesticity. Th ese tools that make homemaking eas-
ier were also tied to the idea of American housewives who can enjoy their 
freedom. In homemaking class, while Japanese brides learned how to use 
ovens, toasters, coﬀ ee makers, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and so on, 
they also learned that American wives can enjoy freedom with the modern 
appliances while Japanese wives were enslaved all day doing hard work.
By teaching Japanese brides how to use these technologies, American vol-
unteers displayed their superior identity as American wives. Interestingly, in 
the report of the classes, American teachers emphasized Japanese brides’ in-
ability to use these appliances rather than anything else. For example, in the 
meeting held in May of 1951, a volunteer reported; “[Japanese girls] were 
wondering how they could make some of the things learned in the cooking 
class in their Japanese homes, because they have no stoves with ovens which 
we consider so necessary to good cooking.”39 Th is comment expressed Japa-
nese girls’ inability to do good cooking because modern technology was not 
available in Japanese domestic culture. Th e superiority of American domestic-
ity is conﬁ rmed with the idea of inferiority of Japanese domesticity deﬁ ned by 
traditional ways of cooking. Another volunteer reported about her class in 
1954 as such: “[T]hey learn how much easier cooking can be with an electric 
oven instead of the smoky hibachi (charcoal burner), a pressure cooker’s ad-
vantage over an okama (rice steamer).”40 By perceiving that Japanese domestic 
culture enslaves wives who lacked modern tools, American domesticity and 
wifehood became superior and liberated.
Family relations, especially bridehood and in-law relationships, also became 
a site to deﬁ ne American superiority: American bridehood and in-law rela-
tionship was narrated as egalitarian and Japanese family relation as hierarchi-
cal and feudalistic.
Undoubtly you have learned by this time that your husband’s mother 
does not hold the same traditional position in American as she would in 
Japan, nor will you, as a member of her household. You will be treated 
more as an equal member of the family than you have been trained to ex-
pect in a Japanese household. As an example, the order of precedence for 
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taking a bath in a Japanese home is ﬁ rst the father, then the sons in order 
of age, mother, daughters, in order of age, then the servants. In an 
American household, there is no order of precedence and if the bath-
room isn’t in use, anyone may use it.41
In-law relations also endorsed the idea of American superiority narrated as 
equal. In doing so, American “equal” family relation becomes possible com-
pared to Japanese family relations, or more to say, deﬁ ned by “unequal” Japa-
nese family relations. By deﬁ ning Japanese family relation as hierarchical and 
unequal, especially Japanese women oppressed in patriarchal Japanese family 
system, the American wife became those who enjoy freedom, equality and 
independence inside of the family. Again, this understanding nicely serves to 
present American women as liberators rather than dominators. Th is is how 
Japanese girls became “loveable” subjects through the bride school project — 
Japanese girls who produce American family and wife as free and equal. In 
doing so, American volunteer women came to love these belated girls “who 
can eventually become American wives” and identiﬁ ed themselves as ambas-
sadors who embody and teach about American freedom and equality.
In addition, the idea of relationship between men and women deﬁ ned su-
periority of American family and wifehood. In home management class, their 
teaching of woman’s relations with men highlighted the idea of American 
“courtesies by men” which are supposedly not available in Japan.
As you have found out in your years or months of marriage to an Amer-
ican man, the behavior of an average American man toward women is 
diﬀ erent from Japanese men to Japanese women. Women in the United 
States are given courtesies by men — even strange men — and they are 
accepted as a matter of course. A strange man may open a door to a pub-
lic building for you, or pick up something you have dropped. Th ese at-
tentions should be accepted graciously but impersonally. When they are 
oﬀ ered, simply smile, say “thank you” and go about your way. It is not 
necessary to be drawn into conversation; that is not expected. American 
men take their wives to most parties. Th ere are stag parties, just for men, 
but these are the exceptions, not the rule.42
American gender relations between women and men were articulated in cour-
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tesies by men such as opening the door, picking up something and taking their 
wives to most parties. “Nicer” American gender relations were deﬁ ned by the 
idea that Japanese men looked down upon women and these men’s courtesies 
were unavailable in Japanese gender relations.
Indeed, bride school itself became visible through Japanese brides who were 
liberated from Japanese male dominant tradition. For example, the 1954 New 
York Times article introduced what bride school taught Japanese brides:
Th e brides are also told that when there are guests in the house they don’t 
have to act like maids, to bow and scrape and stay in the kitchen as their 
sisters and mothers and grandmothers must do. Equality between the 
sexes is not stressed, but every bride-student realizes at the end of the 
course that in America she will no longer be a second-class citizen just 
because of her sex.43
Gender relations became a site where the United States claimed its superiority 
in Cold War politics. Lisa Yoneyama argues that stories of Japanese women’s 
liberation were framed “within the binary logic of gender relations between 
Japanese men and women.”44 Japanese women became victims of only Japa-
nese male dominant culture and patriarchy, but not victims of racism and 
colonialism by the West, especially the United States. Japanese women’s lib-
eration was recast just as “achieving equality and freedom in conjugal relations 
within an imagined bourgeois domesticity.”45 Yoneyama calls this logic “Cold 
War feminism.” Th is logic worked well within the Cold War U.S. empire 
which tried to represent the U.S. occupation of Japan as liberation and reha-
bilitation, but not domination and exploitation. I argue that the bride school 
project became a site that articulated only Japanese wives as victims of Japa-
nese patriarchy and male dominant tradition. In doing so, American wives 
gained their superior identity as women who enjoy freedom and indepen-
dence.
Th is idea of gender equality and freedom was indeed embedded in the nar-
ratives of Japanese brides of their life stories. When Japanese brides explained 
how they adjusted to American wifehood, they highlighted that they learned 
“equality between wife and husband” as a proof of their adjustment to Ameri-
can wifehood. A bride, Kazuko Umezu Stout narrated about American wife-
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hood with the idea of freedom.
Here in America, a wife is free to work outside the home enjoying inde-
pendence but in Japan, a newly wedded shy young wife is rarely free. Th e 
young wife lives with her mother-in-law and there the mother-in-law 
with her rules the home. Our two cultures are centuries apart in time as 
well as space.46
As the above statement saying “A wife is free to work outside the home enjoy-
ing independence” in America while in Japan, a wife is unfree and subordinate 
to her mother-in-law, Stout illustrated that wives’ freedom and independence 
are only obtainable in the United States. Here, her statement highlighted the 
sense of time embedded in the idea of two cultures of the United States and 
Japan: While the United States where accomplished freedom and equality was 
deﬁ ned by advanced sense of time, Japan where only existed traditional ways 
of life was deﬁ ned by lagged sense of time.
By referring to Japan as a place where wives’ freedom and independence are 
unimaginable, Stout represents herself as someone who has adjusted to Amer-
ican wifehood and has acquired freedom and independence in the United 
States.
I told her [my sister], in America women are free to speak their minds. A 
freedom I indulge in frequently in my own home . . . Th ey [my sister 
and her husband] were going home to Japan with a culture centuries old 
and full of ceremony and formal tradition with its careful attention to 
the smallest of details.47
Th rough her narrative in which she indulges in freedom and independence in 
the United States, Stout herself becomes a subject who “would-have-been 
unfree,” obeying the mother-in-law and exposing herself to centuries old tra-
ditional culture and ceremonies. Th ese “would-have-been” narratives became 
prominent in that women’s “authentic voices” lend credit to the idea that free 
and independent lives as wives were only available in the United States. Ethnic 
Studies Scholar Yen Le Espiritu ﬁ nds the refugees’ narrative of “would-have-
been” endorses the idea of better life in the United States. She argues, “the 
‘would-have-beens’ are the most powerful in communicating the allures of the 
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United States because they assume the form of a testimonial — a looking back 
from individuals who have tasted life on the ‘other side.’”48 Her argument was 
speciﬁ c to the case of Vietnamese refugees, but is helpful to understand that 
Japanese brides’ narratives in involving “would-have-been unfree in Japan” 
became eﬀ ective discourses that endorse not only “worse” lives in Japan but 
also conﬁ rm freedom which is only available in the United States.
Another woman, Toshiko, attended the bride school in Tokyo in 1954.49 
She vividly remembers that she was impressed by learning how to use all the 
“modern appliances” such as ovens, irons, washing machines, and vacuum 
cleaners. Along with learning how to use all these appliances, she admired the 
“cool” and “kind” American housewives who taught her how to use all these 
modern appliances. Here, again, the women volunteers were narrated as 
“cool” and “kind” teachers along with the idea of modernity. When she moved 
to the United States, her husband bought her washing machine, vacuum 
cleaner and so on that she learned how to use in bride school. She thought that 
she could do households chores much easier. She explained that she could 
have used a broom and washing board that would have taken more time to 
clean the household if she were in Japan. Her narrative about households also 
entails the idea of “would-have been” which credits American wives’ freedom 
which is only available in the United States.
Th e idea that Japanese brides “would-have-been slaves” if they were in 
Japan also became powerful discourses in the postwar U.S. media. For exam-
ple, the article titled “Pursuit of Happiness” published in 1955 carries the 
story of a Japanese war bride, Sachiko. Sachiko became visible endorsing her 
“would-have-been” slaveness within Japanese domesticity that credits Ameri-
can liberated wifehood. It appeared in this way.
When asked if she wants to go back to Japan, Sachiko laughs mischie-
vously and cries, “Oh no! I not answer that question. I not dumb. Japan 
I be slave. Cold water. Work all day. No rugs on ﬂ oor. I stay here.”50
Sachiko’s idea of “would-be-slave in Japan” endorsed the notion of freedom 
that American wives enjoy.
Japanese brides who deﬁ ned American domesticity as free and gender rela-
tions as equal became perfect objects of American Cold War national fanta-
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sies. Japanese brides’ “would-have-been” narratives endorsed the idea that 
equality and freedom are only available in the United States. “Japanese war 
brides” precisely became objects of “the U.S. rescue fantasies” at the moment 
that America was striving for racial integration and cultural pluralism at the 
beginning of Cold War.51 Th e rhetoric transformed Japanese brides from 
problematic subjects of assimilation to the liberated and American volunteers 
from (possibly) dominators to benevolent teachers and freedom providers. 
Seen as those who were problematic subjects facing American racism, Japanese 
women served to represent the United States as a racially and culturally plural-
ist nation by becoming “American wives who enjoy freedom and equality at 
home.” As Caroline Chung Simpson explains, “Japanese war bride” became a 
prototype of model minority to demonstrate American pluralism, they were 
indeed incorporated into the nation as “belated subjects” as American wives.52 
In so doing, “Japanese war brides” unwittingly became “imperial subjects” 
who proved American superiority of not only domesticity but its nation itself 
as culturally pluralist.
IV. Conclusion
Th is thesis closely pays attention to cultural diﬀ erences embedded in the 
idea of the United States as a culturally pluralist nation. I view the bride school 
run by the Red Cross sponsored by the U.S. military from the early to mid-
1950s throughout Japan as a place where the occupiers taught American ways 
of life to Japanese brides. I argue that the idea of gender freedom and equality 
became key concepts that deﬁ ned the superiority of American wives whom 
Japanese brides should imitate. Within this idea, Japanese women’s interviews 
showed that they used the concept of gender freedom and equality as proof of 
their assimilation and acculturation to the United States. Along with this no-
tion, the American volunteer women articulated that Japanese women were 
enslaved wives to their husbands within the Japanese feudalist patriarchy. Th e 
bride school situated them as Japanese brides who “would” be liberated and 
become like American wives. Th eir belatedness is a valuable and necessary 
component for the bride school as well as the United States to become an 
advanced and benevolent project and nation.
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